Thomas Joscelyn, writing for the Claremont Institute, debunks two misconceptions about Iran, which were contained in a 2004 paper written by Zibigniew Brzezinski and Robert Gates (the later being our current SecDef).

Not heartening if this guy [Gates] has anything to do with U.S. Near East policy.

I've started reading an article in the 1 Jan Weekly Standard where Matthew Continetti discusses the current, best predictor of party affiliation: views on the use of American power abroad.

Those whose view view is primarily concerned with the "attitudes, tendencies, and policies of peace" are more likely to vote Democrat, while those who generally favor the "maintenance and projection of American military power" tend to vote Republican.

There is a fundamental flaw in this dichotomy.  Both sides seek peace (excepting cartoonish "arms dealers" and "defense contractors" who exist only in the fever swamps of conspiracy), but disagree to the means to that end.  One side believes that a Just Peace can only be achieved through the projection and use of force, while the other side prefers the use of negotiation and compromise.  These differing views spring from the differing views of human nature held by each side, if I may be permitted a slight exaggeration.

The right tends to see force as a necessary element to both secure and ensure peace.  This results from viewing human nature as fundamentally corrupt, or corruptible.  In this view, bad things that happen spring from flaws in human nature.

The left sees force as antithetical to securing peace.  People are fundamentally good, and bad things happen because of lack of education.  This lack of education extends to bad ideologies, poor choices, and failure to behave altruistically toward the poor.

What results from this view is differing interpretations of force.  The right sees war as morally neutral, which can be used for both good or bad purposes.  The left sees war as a failure of education: if only both sides understood each other, they'd wouldn't need to go to war.

Nothing here is earth-shattering, but I thought I'd inflict my random thoughts on anyone so unfortunate as wander into this dark--not quite deserted--corner of Townhall. 

Was listening to Col. David Hunt on a local radio show today (it's sports-talk, a bit of local sports and a bit of politics: Chad Hartman 1/10 interview found here) and he threw out the canard that there is no military solution to Iraq: there is only a political solution.  Col. Hunt spoke of the need to build the economy, the infrastructure, and the political culture.

All well and good.

But, hate to be the one to break it to you Colonel, but those goals cannot be achieved in the present state of anarchy.  One cannot build a civil society in the midst of civil war.  Until the militias, Ba'athist holdouts, and terrorists are crushed, there is no political solution.

At the present time, the only solution is military. 

Security is a prerequisite for rebuilding the annihilated infrastructure.  So long as terrorists and others of their ilk run rampant, the infrastructure cannot be reliably rebuilt.  Electricity and plumbing cannot be restored and expanded until substations are secure.  Schools are not safe to attend, in many cases, so building new ones is only preparation--and only that if the schools are not blown up.  Same goes for hospitals.

Security is required to establish a civil society and democratic institutions.  Iraq has gone from a republic of fear to anarchy.  Whether Iraq becomes a republic of laws remains to be seen, but the lack of security does not allow the freedom of association necessary to establish civic organizations and responsible political organizations.  Militias are a constant rebuke to the alleged government.  A government that permits nongovernmental organizations to operate as governments is no government at all.  Until people are free to associate freely a sense of democracy cannot take root.

Security is necessary to allow a legal economy to be established and grow.  When people are not able to walk down the street without the possibility of being blown up, then economic activity is severely limited.  Granted, disorder and sectarian violence is restricted, and parts of Iraq have a blossoming economy, but unless the entire country shares in economic growth of some kind, the sectarian strife will spread to those areas where economic activity exists.

These problems cannot be voted away.  These problems cannot be discussed away.  These problems cannot be focus-grouped away.  These problems cannot be regional conferenced away.

The remaining Ba'athists must be eliminated.  The terrorists must be destroyed.  The militias must be disbanded and Moqtada al-Sadr must be arrested and either imprisoned, or executed.  Whichever way, he must be silenced.

To accomplish this, the borders must be sealed to confine the problem to a closed system.  Continuing to permit destabilizing forces to enter the country--whether from Iran, Syria, or Saudi Arabia--only exacerbates existing problems. 

The terrorists must be hunted down and killed.  To do this, the Iraqi people must be convinced that the U.S. is committed to winning.  If they are convinced that the U.S. is committed to winning, then they will be more willing to cooperate in intelligence gathering operations.  The Ba'athists can be hunted down at the same time.

The militias must be starved out Iranian support and armament.  Support for the militias will diminish when the Shi'a can depend on someone other than the militias to protect them from terrorist attack, and punish criminal acts.  If the so-called Iraqi government were able to protect its citizens it could perform in this capacity.  The only moderately competent part of the Iraqi government is the Iraqi military.  They must be paid, supplied, and properly trained otherwise this useful arm of the Iraqi government will be lost.

You can't make this name up: Iran Syria Policy and Operations Group.

This, apparently, is the name of a covert U.S. group attempting to empower Iranian dissidents.  Well, not covert any longer. 

One good bit about the group: "The group's workings have been so secretive that several officials in the State Department's Near Eastern Affairs Bureau said they were unaware it existed."

The DoS not knowing about something is likely the only thing that kept the group secret as long as it was.

It occurs to me though, that this is something we've been hoping the U.S. has been doing, i.e. funding Iranian dissidents and attempting to locally undermine the mullah-cracy.

We'll see how it goes.

Ethiopia has smashed the "Islamic Courts" of Somalia in conventional war.  The highly professional and experienced Ethiopian military overmatched and overwhelmed the "Islamic Courts" militias.  Those militias are likely to go underground:

"This is going to be the final fight. We still have to wait and see if they (the SICC) are going to go underground or be annihilated," the military expert [not named] said. "The Ethiopians want to finish it."

Presuming that the SICC take the insurgency tack, Ethiopia should be able provide a useful object lesson in how to fight a counter-insurgency. 

I'm guessing a light footprint isn't involved. 

Ahmadinejad explains the effectiveness of UN Security Council resolutions (irresolutions is ever so much more accurate).  The most disturbing, but hardly surprising, bit is found in the last paragraph:

"I want you to know that the Iranian nation has humiliated you many times, and it will humiliate you in the future".

Our irresolution is seen for what it is: weakness.  We did nothing when they committed an act of war against the United States by seizing the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.  We fled from Iranian terrorists in Beruit (Hezb'Allah).  We fled Somalia. 

The use of terrorism against the West has been in full swing since the 1960s. Back then, the groups were the Red Brigades, Action Direct, and Baader Meinhoff. The individuals were Carlos “the Jackal”, George Habash, and Yassir Arafat. The ideological justifications and prescriptions were found in Marx, Lenin, Fanon, and Marighella.

Abu Nidal was a big wheel in the 1980s, a sort of updated Ludlum-esque Carlos the Jackal—a leader of a band of murderers. The PPK (Kurdish Workers Party) was explicitly Marxist. Arafat and the PLO were secular. Habash was a Marxist.

These days, Qutb, al-Banna, UBL, and Zawahri provide the ideological justifications and prescriptions. The current crop has absorbed the lessons of the Leftist terrorists of the ‘60s and ‘70s and has incorporated them: Marighella’s Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla finds its logical conclusion in AQ in Iraq and other explicitly “Muslim[1]” terrorist groups.

Ramzi Yousef, Mohammed Atta, and al-Zarqawi all claimed to be true “Muslims”. Previous butchers claimed similar ideological purity (i.e. communism had never been disproved because it had never been properly applied).

Their goals, however, seem to be markedly similar to those of Marxists of days gone by: establishing a paradise on earth. The obstacle also remains the same: the West (bourgeois values, secular values, whichever).

Why the change? Even Carlos the Jackal converted to “Islam”. Granted, his understanding of Islam seems to very similar to Marxism, if I recall.

Why the shift?

The fall of the Soviet Union deprived many such terrorists of their sponsors. This was not the primary reason for the decline of leftist terrorism (with the notable exception of Latin America, where Leftist terrorism has remained consistently viable: a phenomenon I’ll have to look at later). The reason Marxism has declined as a justification for terrorism is that the fall of the Soviet Union exposed Marxism as a weak ideology, unable to lead its followers to the “promised land”.

Radical Islam defeated Marxism in Afghanistan and the torch was passed. The dispossessed of Europe now gather in radical mosques, rather than in coffee houses discussing the dictatorship of the proletariat.

I’ve discussed this theme previously: ideology as the vehicle chosen to justify savagery. While there are, no doubt, true believers, many merely seek a horse to take them to victory and are willing to hitch their cart to whomever looks like a winner.

This has profound implications for our foreign policy. If we demonstrate weakness, our ideology, democracy, becomes less attractive. Weakness does not attract allies or followers; strength does.

P.M. Maliki is hitching his wagon to al-Sadr and the radical “Shi’aism” that al-Sadr represents. Why? Because we demonstrate weakness and al-Sadr demonstrates strength.

Ahmadinejad and Kim ignore U.S. warning with impunity. Why? Because they have nothing to fear. They demonstrate strength and gather allies. Chavez and Assad have tied the knot with Twelver “Islam” and Ahmadinejad (Kim may be too nutty to attract friends. Either that, or his Stalinist he11-hole isn’t even attractive to despots the world over).

Light footprints and sunshine may “work” in the halls of diplomacy, but they are seen for what they are in the real world: weakness.

How’s that for some realism for ya?

[1] I don’t claim that they are Muslims. I am not qualified to make that determination. I’m a Lutheran, for pete’s sakes. However, they seem to think they are Muslims. Ergo, I will refer to them as Muslims. I’ll put it in “quotation marks” to set off the difference for the easily offended.

An interesting article on mercenaries.  Especially so if one is a fan of the British author, Frederick Forsythe, particularly his novel, The Dogs of War.

Makes one see the novel in a new light.

On a completely unrelated note, mercenaries, private armies, whatever one would like to call them, by their existance, constitute a threat to the legitimacy of the nation-state.

Why is this?

When mercenaries provide security and other defensive postures, they engage in acts that are acceptable in a nation-state, where the authority to use offensive force is supposed to lie.  Permitting the existance of non-state controlled, offensive organizations presents a constant rebuke to the nation-state. 

Nation-states are supposed to be the sole authority to use offensive force.

Nation-states support militaries which protect the state, and its citizens.  Nation-states maintain authority to use coercive force, in terms of  the criminal justice system.  Nation-states hold the legal responsibility to conduct executions (Thank you Saddam Hussein for demonstrating that...good riddance to bad rubbish).

Private citizens may protect themselves, their friends, buildings, or complete strangers, but they are not legally authorized to use purely offensive force.  The existance of private, offensive militaries challenges the nation-state's authority and legitimacy.

Not a particularly original thought.  The article reference above provoked the line of thought (and I needed to write something here).

The U.S. continues to find new and inventive ways to turn its back on its allies.

It's a wonder we've any left.

Mark Steyn's new book, "America Alone", presents a world where demographic forces have left the U.S. alone in its war against radical Islam.  With our policies, it's a wonder we've allies as it is:

In 1956 the U.S. abandoned Hungarian rebels to Soviet tanks.

In 1956, the U.S. backed the U.N. and Nasser against Britain, France and Israel, when Nasser seized the Suez.

In 1976, the U.S. stood by as the communists, backed by the Soviet Union, united Viet Nam.  Thousands of Vietnamese fled in rickety boats, only to be returned to re-education camps by the U.N.

In 1991, the U.S. stood by while Saddam slaughtered rebeling Shi'a, who rebeled under the impression that the U.S. would support them.

The U.S. has consistently been inconsistent in its support of Israel.  From vetoing U.N. resolutions condemning Israel, to demanding the Israel make peace with a people ostensibly represented by the terrorist, Yassir Arafat.

The U.S. has been searching for ways to slowly abandon Afghanistan to the Taliban (with the able assistance of the U.S.'s schizophrenic ally, Pakistan).  Turning Afghanistan over to NATO, a military organization with several members who refuse to actually fight, is step one to achieving defeat.

The U.S. has been searching for ways, since 2003, to abandon Iraqi democrats and those who risked their lives to vote, and those who have risked their lives to enlist in the INA.

Lebanese politicians are murdered by a nation that the U.S. seeks to negotiate its surrender with, in Iraq (a nation, Syria, that has been on the State Department list of terrorist sponsoring regimes for decades).

The schizophrenia of the U.S.'s treatment of its allies and friends is disturbing.  It is also not a way in which to win friends and influence people (except possibly influence people in a bad way).

Since when is the average the best solution in matters of policy disputes? Isn’t that what the ISG report provides? Isn’t that what so-called “realists” have been pining for? An average?

The recommendations are little more than the average of political thought: “well, obviously we cannot stay…obviously we cannot just pull out precipitously…we must incentivize our departure…we cannot abandon Iraqi democrats (such as they are…)”

In what alternate universe is splitting the difference between two diametrically opposed viewpoints the best way to come to a solution? Was any thought actually put into the report? Did they just draw up position maps and triangulate to the middle?

Leaving aside the fact that the commission was made up of amateurs, we are still left with the fact that they didn’t even try to come up with difficult solutions to trying problems. They sought the easy way out.

What was the easy way out? Diplomacy with our enemies.

It is true that one needs not concern oneself overmuch with negotiating with one’s friends, but it does not necessarily follow that merely talking with one’s enemies is a problem solver.

There needs to be a common interest that can be forged. Just as on the Korean peninsula concerning the PRC, Iran and Syria gain strength in the region when Iraq is in disarray. So long as there is not a massive movement of refugees, the present situation in Iraq is in the interests of bad actors in the region (as opposed to bad actors in Hollywood… Sorry).

The only common ground is that Syria and Iran cannot want us to leave. Beyond that, there is nothing. And it’s not as though they’d like us to stay for the same reasons that we want to stay. They want us to stay so that we can be killed. Granted, they can convince themselves that our departure is also (or even more so) a victory: they felled the Great Satan. They can learn to deal with refugees (likely the way that Syria dealt with potential revolt in Hama).

It’s long past time we reconsider how we create our Commissions. Panels of experts should not be on hand to advise bureaucrats and politicians: they should be the commission and a panel of bureaucrats and retired politicians ought to be on hand to advise and edit for tone.

 


I so enjoy lawyers.  Calvin and Hobbes is the greatest comic, ever (at least during the last three decades, or so).

Nature abhors a vacuum.

Terrorists love a vacuum.

And I'm not talking about a Kirby.

What the first thing that will happen with the retreat of coalition forces?

Mob and militia rule.  Al Sadr's Mahdi militia, Sunni rejectionists, and Ba'athist holdouts will vie for control.  We've seen this happen in Afghanistan in the 1990s (incidentally NATO forces seem intent on allowing it to happen again) and we see it in Somalia today.

The alleged humanitarian crisis that was to accompany the invasion will be realized, in spades, with our departure.  Assyrian Christians, Turkmen, and other minority groups already face death and ethnic cleansing at the hand of mobs and militias.  The coalition is the last line of defense (even if, currently, political pressures get in the way of acting as any line of defense, in many cases) for these groups.

Iraqi military and police do not possess, yet, the professionalism that is necessary to stop them from engaging in illegitimate violence.  We see it today, with coalition troops still in Iraq, as police units and military units behave as death squads, looking out for sectarian interests, when not babysat by coalition forces.  The mere presence of U.S. forces deters much atrocity, as INA seek the approval of the greatest military in the history of the world.  Whose approval would they seek in the absence of American forces? 

Until a coherent Iraqi identity is formed, our departure will lead to anarchy, a vacuum of power.  The purpose of terrorism is to seek power and control: power to define a religion or a people; or the ability to control resources, cultural or natural.  A power vacuum permits them to move in and begin exercising power, to begin realizing their "ideal" state. 

The power vacuum that followed the Reign of Terror led to Napoleon and total war across the continent.  Terrorists, ba'athists, and Sunni rejectionists will vie against the Syrian-Iranian coalition to dominate Iraq.  Saudi Wahhabism will enter the fray (more so than presently) against all comers.

It is likely a stretch to claim that total war would rage in the Near East, with the departure of coalition forces.  It is not a stretch, however, to claim that hundreds of thousands would die or go into exile; Iraq would become a seething cauldron of factionalism, extremism, and terrorism; and the image of America as a useful and dependable ally would die (to the extent that it hasn't, already).

We've already allowed Somalia to become such a place where terrorists breed and decency dies.  Pakistan has ceded Waziristan to such a fate.  Parts of Afghanistan remain outside the control of ANA troops, and in the hands of a resurgent Taliban, militias, and warlords.

The world is dangerous enough without the U.S. contributing another petrie dish of terrorism, anarchy, and murder to the world.  We face a resurgent Russia, a nuclear North Korea, and a nuclear Iran.  That's bad enough, but with North Korea a known proliferator and terrorist state, and Iran a terrorist state, nuclear weapons will spread throughout the Near East, ostensibly in self-defense, but also to stoke the egos of autocrats.  Latin America is regressing economically as yet more nations have embraced leaders wedded to the failed statist policies of the past: Chavez, Morales, Ortega, and Castro. 

It's always gratifying to see a more intelligent person express the same ideas that rattle around my head.  Michael Rubin manages to do so much more clearly, though.

It has been clear for months, if not years, that withdrawal is imminent.  All the insurgents need to do is run out the clock.  Why should the Iraqi government move strongly against the militias and the insurgents?  They have no guarantee that the U.S. will back them up.  On the contrary, the U.S. has given every indication that it lacks the resolve necessary to be a reliable ally.

We set a bar for victory requiring a democratic Iraq, but then tie our own hands.  We act as though we will bug out at any moment, and thereby set ourselves, and Iraq, up for failure. 

The Baker Commission is the 9/11 Commission redux.  It is bureaucratic arse-covering.

More of same.