The original UN resolutions, which left Sadaam in power, required Sadaam to affirmatively demonstrate the destruction and dismantling of his WMD programs. He did not do so. Therefore, he was in violation of the resolutions granting him a ceasefire and an actual resumption of hostilities (as opposed to the cat and mouse game played by American and British pilots with Iraqi anti-aircraft batteries) was a foregone conclusion, if the US is to be respected. Countries may disagree with our policies; they may disagree with actions, our idea of diplomacy, or our use of the military. Other countries may even hate us and what they think we represent. If we bent to the whims of polls, in contradiction to our considered view of our national interest, we could not be respected and we would invite attack.

Consider, for example, the characterization of the US by bin Ladin. He considered us to be a paper tiger, who would run if we suffered any casualties. He saw the evidence of Viet Nam, Iran, Lebanon, and Somalia. He was high on the victory over the Soviets. He knew we could be pushed without suffering any repercussions. He hit us in Khobar. He hit us in the port of Aden. He hit sovereign US territory when he blew up embassies in East Africa. We did nothing and he knew we would do nothing; he had the evidence of Tehran.

In 2001 we were hit again. Bin Ladin had told us on multiple occasions why we would be hit (perceived or real offenses): infidel occupation of the Land of the Two Mosques; Israeli oppression of the Palestinians; and continued American and British oppression of Iraq. These reasons were given in 1996 and again in 1998 in “declarations of war” against the “crusader and Zionist alliance.” Bin Ladin would continue to hit us with impunity if we did nothing. The pattern was very clear.

Two months after the attack on New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, after Taliban refusals to turn over bin Ladin, we invaded Afghanistan. We used limited ground forces, with a reliance on the indigenous Northern Alliance, and airpower to overthrow the Taliban regime in six weeks. It has been claimed the Bush had a secret plan to invade Afghanistan before the attacks of 9/11, but he was just looking for a reason. Even if he did, how does that matter? He was prepared to engage a nation that was on the State Department list of terrorist sponsoring nations, was not recognized as legitimate, and was a consistent and flagrant violator of human rights—Is there supposed to be something wrong with that?

After deposing the Taliban regime, focus shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq. Was this a natural progression?

Was the shift from Afghanistan to Iraq a natural progression, or was Operation Iraqi Freedom a “war of choice?” Perhaps Bush did not sell the necessity of the war as well as he ought, but that in no way detracts from the necessity of the War in Iraq. That's right, necessity, not choice. This was to be a War on Terror, not a war on Al Qaeda.

Taliban Afghanistan was a supporter of terrorism. Taliban Afghanistan merely hid Al Qaeda (see Jason Burke Al Qaeda: Casting a shadow of terror, 2003), provided money laundering assistance, and training areas (basically, hands off, carte blanche, etc). The Taliban did not request targets. The Taliban did not order targets. The Taliban did not actively sponsor specific act of terrorism.

This is in contrast to Sadaam's Iraq (hereafter referred to as Iraq), which provided training (Salman Pak), subsidized homicide bombers in Palestine, directly sponsored and requested specific acts (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Prague), committed terrorist acts itself (genocide against its own people), provided comfort and aid to the murderer behind Achille Lauro (Abu Abbas), provided aid and comfort to one of the original Trade Center bombers (Abdul Rahman Yasin), provided a base of operations (twice) to the Abu Nidal Organization, and sponsored the attempted murder of a Former American President (this should have been sufficient in 1994, especially when combined with Iraq's blatant disregard for the terms of the ceasefire that left Sadaam in power). Iraq had twice invaded surrounding nations (Iran and Kuwait, and a third and fourth, Israel and Saudi Arabia, if one counts the Scuds rained down on these nations), and was a destabilizing force in a region that is vital to our energy security. This does not even begin to address humanitarian concerns about the Oil for Food program, and the brutal oppression of minority groups. The US’s Global War on Terrorism would mean nothing if we did not invade such a nation.

There are those who claim that because Iraq had nothing to do with the attacks of 9/11, any attack on Iraq is, on its face, not justified and immoral. This is faulty reasoning. The war declared was not a war merely on Al Qaeda, but rather on those who use terrorist tactics to advance their causes. The preceding paragraph briefly lists Sadaam’s connections to terrorism and terrorist tactics. (See, also, Patterns of Global Terrorism, published by the State Department for the history of Iraq’s sponsorship of terrorism).